Polysyllogism
A polysyllogism (also called multi-premise syllogism, sorites, climax, or gradatio) is a string of any number of propositions forming together a sequence of syllogisms such that the conclusion of each syllogism, together with the next proposition, is a premise for the next, and so on. Each constituent syllogism is called a prosyllogism except the last, because the conclusion of the last syllogism is not a premise for another syllogism.
Example
    
An example for a polysyllogism is:
- It is raining.
 - If we go out while it is raining we will get wet.
 - If we get wet, we will get cold.
 - Therefore, if we go out we will get cold.
 
Examination of the structure of the argument reveals the following sequence of constituent (pro)syllogisms:
- It is raining.
 - If we go out while it is raining we will get wet.
 - Therefore, if we go out we will get wet.
 
- If we go out we will get wet.
 - If we get wet, we will get cold.
 - Therefore, if we go out we will get cold.
 
Sorites
    
A sorites (plural: sorites) is a specific kind of polysyllogism in which the predicate of each proposition is the subject of the next premise. Example:
- All lions are big cats.
 - All big cats are predators.
 - All predators are carnivores.
 - Therefore, all lions are carnivores.
 
The word sorites /sɒˈraɪtiːz/ comes from Ancient Greek: σωρίτης, heaped up, from σωρός heap or pile. Thus a sorites is a heap of propositions chained together. A sorites polysyllogism should not be confused with the sorites paradox, a.k.a. the fallacy of the heap.
Lewis Carroll uses sorites in his book Symbolic Logic (1896). For example:[1]
- No experienced person is incompetent;
 - Jenkins is always blundering;
 - No competent person is always blundering.
 - Jenkins is inexperienced.
 
Carroll's example may be translated thus:
- All experienced persons are competent persons.
 - No competent persons are blunderers.
 - Jenkins is a blunderer.
 - Jenkins is not an experienced person.
 
See also
    
- Anadiplosis - the rhetorical grounds of polysyllogism.
 - Transitive relation
 - Type of syllogism (disjunctive, hypothetical, legal, poly-, prosleptic, quasi-, statistical)
 
Notes
    
- Lewis Carroll (1897). Symbolic Logic. Project Gutenberg. p. 113.
 
Bibliography
    
- B. P. Bairan. An Introduction to Syllogistic Logic. Goodwill Trading. p. 342. ISBN 971-574-094-4.