1st Interceptor and Strike Fighter Squadron (Brazil)

Explosion on British frigate HMS Antelope, hit by an Argentine Skyhawk during the Falklands War

Observation of the Falklands War, fought between Argentina and the United Kingdom in 1982, made the Brazilian Navy realize its weakness in a hypothetical conflict in the South Atlantic.[2]^: 180 Argentine aircraft sank or damaged several British ships with anti-ship missiles and bombs, and only did no more damage due to the heavy casualties they suffered to British aircraft with air-to-air missiles. By offering air superiority and power projection over land and sea, aircraft carriers confirmed their importance as the core of fleets. Brazil had the aircraft carrier Minas Gerais, acquired in 1956, but its function was anti-submarine warfare; it did not have the ideal size and capabilities to operate jets.[3]^{: 176–177}

Officers in academic positions in the 1980s, breaking with this paradigm, began to defend a fleet with power projection, equipped with its own fighters.[2]^: 181Soon after the war, in 1983, Minister of the Navy Maximiano Eduardo da Silva Fonseca presented a statement of reasons for the purchase of 12 A-4 Skyhawk aircraft to president João Figueiredo.[4]^: 133 The seller would be the Israeli Air Force, but there were no financial and political conditions for the purchase.[2]^: 216 Still before the war, at the turn of the 70s to 80s, the purchase of Israeli Skyhawks, to be operated by the FAB aboard Minas Gerais, was vetoed by the Ministry of Planning.[5] Another possibility, the development of an onboard version of the Alenia/Aermacchi/Embraer AMX A-1 attack aircraft, was announced, but was canceled in 1985.[2]^: 192

The following decade brought more arguments in favor of having fighters on board. With the end of the Cold War, the hypothesis of using Minas Gerais to defend maritime commerce against Soviet submarines no longer had a place.[6]^: 137 The goal changed to a "balanced squadron", with air coverage for its surface assets sailing far from the coast.[7]^: 65 It was also argued based on the performance of the naval force in exercises and air support for Marine Corps contingents sent on United Nations peacekeeping missions.[8]^: 118 The end of the useful life of the FAB planes embarked in Minas Gerais, and of the aircraft carrier itself, was approaching, opening up an opportunity for the navy. The Brazilian Air Force had no plans for a replacement for its maritime patrol P-16 Trackers, organized in the 1st Embarked Aviation Group (GAE).[lower-alpha 1] It was going through one of the worst moments in its history and had higher priorities, such as SIVAM.[2]^{: 210–211}In the absence of the 1st GAE, Minas Gerais was reduced to the role of a helicopter carrier.[2]^: 20

Kuwaiti Air Force A-4KUs

The Brazilian Navy decided to directly obtain a batch of interceptors instead of the slower route, which would be to first acquire training aircraft.[8]^: 120 The chosen model would need compatibility with Minas Gerais[9]^: 22 and equivalence to the Super Étendard of the Argentine Navy. The options considered were the Étendard itself or the A-4 Skyhawk.[2]^: 206 The Skyhawk was chosen as an "opportunity purchase",[8]^: 120 taking advantage of the offer of retired models from the Kuwait Air Force with many spare parts and good condition: an average of 1,700 flight hours,[10] without exhausting on-board operations,[11]^: 67–71 and, thanks to the desert conditions, little corrosion.[12] An opposing argument was that obsolete planes would end up unusable due to the lack of logistical support.[2]^: 206

The Skyhawk is an American jet known for its service in the Vietnam War in the 1960s,[13]^{: ch. 3} in which it took off from U.S. Navy aircraft carriers to bomb land targets. Interception of enemy aircraft was the responsibility of the F-4 Phantom II.[14]^: 6 The A-4 was designed as a bomber.[13]^{: ch. 3} Attack aircraft like it have crucial differences from dedicated interceptors like the F-4. The attack aircraft has good maneuverability, but its externally transported load has high drag, creating aerodynamic problems and making it difficult to reach supersonic speed. The interceptor needs precisely this speed to fulfill its function, in addition to flying at higher altitudes.[15]^: 272 The Skyhawk is a subsonic aircraft, but it can exceed the supersonic speed when diving.[16] For admiral Armando Amorim Vidigal, the Skyhawk is not ideal for the role assigned to it by the Brazilian Navy, and the right thing to do would have been to buy interceptors and aerial early warning aircraft. However, it was unlikely that these planes would be able to operate in Minas Gerais.[8]^: 120 In 2000, an article in Revista Marítima Brasileira suggested that the Skyhawk's successor would be a multiple-purpose aircraft, combining attack and interception characteristics, as it was already trending in the United States.[15]^: 274

On the other hand, the U.S. Navy itself recognized the possibilities of the Skyhawk as a fighter, assigning some to the air defense of aircraft carriers. Its Skyhawks on bombing missions ended up engaging in aerial combat with MiG fighters,[13]^{: ch. 3} and after the war they simulated opposing MiGs in training. Because of their low cost and relatively cheap maintenance, large numbers were exported to other countries, where, in a light weight configuration, they could serve as fighters on small aircraft carriers.[13]^: 7 Australia and Argentina operated Skyhawks from aircraft carriers of the same class as Minas Gerais.[8]^: 120 The robust structure of this aircraft for embarked operations ensured longevity in service.[13]^: 7 The Skyhawks of the Argentine Air Force and Naval Aviation were the most successful aircraft in attacks against ships during the Falklands War, but suffered heavy casualties. Most of its flights were made from bases on land, as the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo was removed from the operations zone after the sinking of the ARA General Belgrano by a submarine.[13]^{: ch. 5}

Technologically, the A-4 Skyhawk entered service in 1956 and was equivalent to two generations of fighters before the F/A-18 Hornet,[17] a multiple-purpose aircraft that, in the 1990s, replaced the A-6 as a attack by the U.S. Navy.[15]^: 273 In the same decade, the Argentine Air Force acquired modernized Skyhawks (Lockheed Martin A-4AR).[13]^{: ch. 4} After the Gulf War in 1990–1991, Kuwait replaced its Skyhawks with the F/A-18 Hornet. Kuwaiti A-4s had been purchased in 1974, along with Mirage F1 fighters, and fought in the war.[16] At the time, they were advanced within the Skyhawk family, but by the end of the 2000s the gap in relation to modern multi-purpose fighters was clear. Brazilian Skyhawks were the last in the world to take off from aircraft carriers. In 2014, with the imminent decommissioning of Israeli A-4s, Brazil and Argentina were the last countries to fly this plane.[12]

NAeL Minas Gerais in 1996, in its last years

Officers went to Argentina and Uruguay in 1994 to train as pilots. In September 1996, Navy Minister Mauro César Rodrigues Pereira presented his statement of reasons for purchasing the aircraft.[9]^: 21 However, the navy's ambition came up against the legal prohibition of having fixed-wing aircraft. Its fierce dispute with the Brazilian Air Force over embarked aviation had concluded in 1965: a decree restricted Naval Aviation to helicopters, disappointing the naval officers. Three decades later, they returned to the same agenda.[18][19]^: 41

Minister Mauro César would have as internal obstacles the FAB, the army and the economic agenda of ​​Fernando Henrique Cardoso's government, and externally, Argentine distrust.[20]^{: ch. 1} The Argentine Navy became an ally, as it already developed good relations with the Brazilian Navy and, after deactivating its aircraft carrier in 1997, it intended to keep its naval aviation functioning. The Argentines, and not the FAB, helped train the Brazilian Navy pilots during this period. Two Argentine officers were part of the Brazilian delegation in Kuwait,[21]^: 97 and an A-4Q from the Argentine Naval Aviation was used for tests on board Minas Gerais.[20]^{: ch. 1}

The training in Argentina and Uruguay had not been negotiated as part of the foreign policy of their respective countries, but through independent channels of communication between their military.[21]^: 118 Minister of Aeronautics Lélio Viana Lobo declared that he had learned about the training by "cross roads".[21]^: 98 The resources for the purchase came from the navy itself through the Naval Fund.[2]^: 215 The London Naval Commission began preparing the contract after the Brazilian Navy received the offer for the A-4, in June 1997.[2]^: 210 The process revealed the autonomy of each of the Armed Forces branches among themselves and in relation to the government,[22]^: 155 and this lack of consensus impelled the government to increase its political control over the military, contributing to the creation of the National Defense Policy (PDN) in 1996.[21]^: 118 In 1997, journalist Antônio Carlos Pereira, from Estado de S. Paulo, accused the navy of having presented the purchase to the president as a fait accompli and of subverting the PND and inter-branch cooperation.[22]^: 155 According to naval aviator Pedro Lynch, admiral Mauro César had Fernando Henrique Cardoso's authorization to make the purchase since 1997.[2]^: 215

The letter of intent for the purchase was signed by the respective governments on 19 December 1997.[9]^: 21 The reception was not unanimous in the Armed Forces. The Minister of Aeronautics said he was surprised. For Army Minister Zenildo de Lucena, the Skyhawks were "crap".[21]^: 98 The controversy came to a head. The Air Force insisted on its monopoly on airspace defense, and within the navy itself there was dissent, as resources were scarce and investment would come at the expense of the nuclear submarine program, a priority until then. Proponents of the purchase had doctrinal arguments in their favor, as Brazil was the only country in the world with a mixed arrangement (navy and air force) on aircraft carriers.[2]^: 21 Folha de S. Paulo reported in January 1998 that only an older minority within the FAB defended an "indivisible" air force, and the transfer of embarked aviation to the navy would bring savings to the FAB.[2]^: 219 President Fernando Henrique Cardoso intervened in favor of the navy and on 8 April 1998 he issued a decree repealing the ban on fixed wing aircraft in naval aviation.[2]^: 21 By increasing military salaries and financing technological modernization, including fighters, the president sought to pave the way for increased control.[23]^: 41 For the navy in particular, he sought to somewhat placate its demands, which had the least influence of the three branches of the armed forces.[2]^: 221